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Note
ACCRUED FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. PRIME RETAIL, INC.:
RESURRECTING BARRATRY IMPOSES DETOUR ON
ROAD TO MODERNIZATION OF MARYLAND
CONTRACTS JURISPRUDENCE
In Accrued Financial Services, Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether liti-
gation financing contracts and related assignments between Accrued
Financial Services, Inc. (AFS) and its clients, a number of shopping
center tenants, were void as against public policy.2 The court held
that the assignments, which gave AFS exclusive control over all poten-
tial legal claims the tenants might have against their landlord, were
unenforceable because they violated Maryland's strong public policy
against barratry.' The court also rejected AFS's argument that the
parties' contractual choice-of-law provision must be honored, reason-
ing that the provision should not be honored because it violated a
fundamental public policy of the forum state.4 Finally, the court
deemed the assignments violative of Maryland public policy because
they called for AFS to provide expert testimony for a contingent fee.5
In its holding, the Fourth Circuit asserted a public policy against
barratry that is unsupported by prior case law or statutory authority.
The court also demonstrated an inadvisable paternalism by using an
antiquated and seldom-applied doctrine to invalidate an arm's length
contractual agreement crafted by sophisticated business entities with
equal bargaining power.6 The decision ignored a body of well-rea-
soned authority declaring barratry inapplicable to certain modern
1. 298 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 295-96.
3. Id. at 298; see infra notes 43-71 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of
the evolution of the doctrines of barratry, champerty, and maintenance).
4. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 297, 300. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
on section 187(b) (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. at 297.
5. Id. at 300.
6. Id. at 291-93. The list of tenants named in the suit included a number of national
retailers. Id. As the dissent noted, "[t]here [was] every reason to believe that [these] te-
nants . . . were able to bargain with AFS on equal footing." Id. at 306 (Michael, J.,
dissenting).
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contracts. 7 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's paternalistic approach
is troubling because it disregards the benefits accorded to AFS's te-
nants by the assignments-namely, protection against their landlord's
fraudulent billing practices.8
Instead of applying the outmoded doctrine of barratry, the
Fourth Circuit should have utilized a balancing-of-the-equities stan-
dard for analyzing modern contractual arrangements formerly consid-
ered champertous.' Such an approach would serve the dual purposes
of protecting the parties' freedom of contract, while preserving the
court's power to invalidate exploitive or onerous agreements.
1. THE CASE
AFS is a California-based corporation that provides auditing ser-
vices to clients in the commercial real estate industry.' ° A number of
shopping center tenants hire AFS to conduct audits of the common
area maintenance charges that landlords add to tenants' rent bills."
In exchange for conducting such audits, AFS requires that tenants pay
it a percentage of any overcharges recovered on the tenants' behalf,
and that tenants assign to AFS any legal claims they might have against
their landlord.1 2 The agreements also give AFS control over any litiga-
7. See infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have
narrowed the scope of barratry, champerty, and maintenance to exclude certain
contracts).
8. See Accrued Fin. Sers., 298 F.3d at 301 (Michael,J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge
Michael noted that it was not economically feasible for most of the tenants to conduct their
own audits. Id. Therefore, by grouping with other tenants to hire AFS, these tenants
gained protection against the "systematic and pervasive" overbilling exacted by respondent-
landlord, Prime. See Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 295. Judge Michael emphasized this
point, noting:
In most cases, each tenant's claim for an audit period (usually one year) is rela-
tively small in dollar amount .... But AFS, by securing audit engagements from
several tenants in the same mall and then conducting a single audit for those
tenants, makes the contractual right to conduct audits meaningful for the individ-
ual tenant.
Id. at 301 (Michael, J., dissenting).
9. See infra notes 210-211 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of the
balancing-of-the-equities test).
10. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 294.
11. Id. at 300 (Michael, J., dissenting).
12. Accrued Fin. Sers., 298 F.3d at 294. AFS regularly enters into a "Letter of Agree-
ment Regarding Leased Locations" with clients. Id. This agreement authorizes AFS to act
as the "sole and exclusive representative" of the tenant for purposes of evaluating lease
details and "to contact, negotiate, and settle with Clients' landlords any overcharge[s] dis-
covered by AFS." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The assignment of tenants' legal claims is done through an "Assignment of Cause of
Action," by which the tenant assigns to AFS "any and all causes of action [the tenant] may
have against its landlord arising solely from periodic (including annual) charges of any
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tion occurring as a result of its efforts to enforce the claims and entitle
AFS to receive a forty to fifty percent commission on the net recov-
ery. 13 Specifically, the Letter of Agreement empowers AFS to pursue
any overcharges using "its normal collection practices, including au-
thority to file all lawsuits under AFS's name as plaintiff and full discre-
tion [after consultation with the tenant] to accept or reject any
settlement or other disposition."14 In addition, if the tenant declines
to pursue the discrepancy, the tenant must pay forty percent of the
discrepancy as a cancellation fee for services rendered. 5
In 1997, AFS conducted client lease audits at two factory outlet
malls, one in Michigan and one in Baltimore, Maryland. 6 During the
audits, AFS discovered that the respondent-landlord, Prime Retail,
Inc. (Prime), had made improper charges and assessments that could
not be dismissed as errors or aggressive billing practices.17 Further-
more, AFS explained that the errors were "systematic and pervasive."18
In May 1998, AFS initiated the case's circuitous path to the
Fourth Circuit by obtaining assignments from a number of tenants,
and, on their behalf, sending Prime a demand letter detailing the
claims against it.19 Prime responded by seeking a declaratory judg-
ment in Maryland state court, asserting that AFS lacked standing to
pursue the claims.2° At the same time, AFS filed suit in the District
Court for the Central District of California against Prime, alleging,
inter alia, RICO violations.21 The California court transferred the case
to the District of Maryland, where AFS voluntarily dismissed the suit
without prejudice.22
Next, AFS filed an action in Maryland state court, alleging nine
counts on behalf of several of its tenants and two counts in its own
type whatsoever made by or on behalf of the Landlord." Id. at 295 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The assignment authorizes AFS to "adjust, compromise, or settle the as-
signed cause of action at its reasonable discretion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 295. The net recovery is defined as "the total recovery less attorneys fees and
litigation costs." Id.
14. Id. at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 295.
16. Id. The Michigan mall, at the time of the audit, was owned by Horizon Group, Inc.,
and the Baltimore mall was owned by Prime Retail, Inc. Id. Subsequent to the audits,
Prime Retail acquired Horizon, and now the entities together are known as Prime Retail,
Inc. Id. at 295 n.1.
17. Id. at 295.
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. AFS sued on behalf of seventeen tenants located in Prime Retail malls. Id.
20. Id. Prime filed this action in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County. Id.
21. Id. AFS also alleged violations of the California Business and Professions Code,




name. 23 Prime removed this second action to federal district court
and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. 24  The district court
granted Prime's motion to dismiss on the ground that the tenants'
assignments of claims to AFS were "void as a matter of public policy
because they [were] champertous. '' 25 The district court found that
the agreements violated both California and Maryland's prohibition
against contingent fees for expert witnesses, particularly because the
agreements called for AFS employees to act as audit witnesses in the
event of a trial.26
The district court initially noted that, under section 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, as adopted in both Maryland
and California, 2 7 the parties' choice of California law had to be
honored unless enforcement of the contract would violate a "funda-
mental policy of a jurisdiction which has a materially greater interest
than California in determining the validity of the assignment .... 28
Thus, the court framed the issue as whether witness contingency fee
agreements violate public policy of the United States or Maryland.2 9
The court answered in the affirmative, stating that the contracts' fi-
nancial incentives for the "falsification or exaggeration of testimony
threaten[ed] the very integrity of the judicial process." 30  Conse-
quently, the district court dismissed the claims asserted by AFS on be-
half of its clients, reasoning that the assignments were void as against
23. Id. AFS filed this suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Id. The suit included
nine claims on behalf of AFS and seventeen of its tenants and two claims of tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations and prospective advantage solely in AFS's name. Id.
24. Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., No. CVJFM-99-2573, 2000 WIL
976800, at *1 (D. Md. June 19, 2000). In support of its motion to dismiss, Prime again
asserted that AFS lacked standing because it was not the real party in interest. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *2, *3 n.3.
27. See Nat'l Glass, Inc. v.J.C. Penney Props., Inc., 336 Md. 606, 610, 650 A.2d 246, 248
(1994) (noting the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187 in
Maryland); Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Cal. 1992) (adopt-
ing section 187 in California).
28. Accrued Fin. Servs., 2000 WL 976800, at *2. The choice-of-law provision specified
that the contract between AFS and its clients was to be "governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of California." Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 295 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
29. Accrued Fin. Servs., 2000 WIL 976800, at *2.
30. Id. at *3. The district court acknowledged the important role of auditing services,
as provided by AFS, in deterring fraudulent billing practices by mall landlords. Id. at *3
n.3. However, the court declared that those services could be provided without contingent
fee arrangements. Id. Moreover, the district court added that procedural devices, such as
class action suits and rules allowing joinder of claims, are available to protect tenants. Id
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public policy and that therefore AFS lacked standing to bring claims
on the tenants' behalf."'
AFS then filed a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit,3 2 and also filed an identical suit in state court to pre-
vent the statute of limitations from barring its state law claims.33
Prime again removed the case to federal court, where the district
court, citing res judicata, again dismissed the nine counts brought by
AFS on behalf of its tenants.3 As to the state law claims, which AFS
brought in its own name, the district court stayed disposition pending
appeal, and ultimately certified final judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). 3 AFS again appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
presenting the court with two appeals raising an identical issue-
whether the contractual arrangements between AFS and its tenants
were void as against the public policy of Maryland.36
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Maryland and other jurisdictions, contemporary recognition
of the related doctrines of barratry, champerty, and maintenance are
remnants of the early English common law prohibition against certain
types of contractual arrangements.3 ' Early manifestations of these
doctrines criminalized the "officious stirring up of' or "intermed-
dling" in a lawsuit by one who was not the real party in interest.3"
Over time, however, states modernized their view of these doctrines in
four ways. First, a number of states narrowed their scope via statute.39
Second, other states abolished these doctrines in recognition of the
modern view of the value of contractual arrangements considered
champertous at common law.4 ° Third, some states never adopted
31. Id. at *3. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
AFS's state law claims.





37. See Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 349 Md. 441, 456-58, 709 A.2d
112, 119-20 (1998) (discussing the common law origins of champerty, maintenance, and
barratry).
38. Id. at 457, 709 A.2d at 120.
39. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-604(a) (1) (2000) (prohibiting
individuals from "solicit[ing] another person to sue or to retain a lawyer to represent the
other person in a lawsuit").
40. See, e.g., Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000) (abol-
ishing in South Carolina champerty as a defense to contract enforcement); see also Saladini
v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1225-27 (Mass. 1997) (abolishing in Massachusetts the doc-
trine of champerty, citing its "checkered history" in Massachusetts and elsewhere).
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these doctrines in the first place.4 Finally, other states considered
contracts evidencing barratry, champerty, or maintenance to be void
as against public policy.
4 2
A. The Origin and Evolution of Champerty, Barratry, and Maintenance
1. Doctrinal Roots.-In Maryland and other states where barratry
is prohibited by statute, these statutes retain remnants of the ancient
condemnation of financing or interfering in a third party's litiga-
tion.4 3 Dating back as far as the ancient Greek and Roman legal sys-
tems, champerty and barratry were considered part of a family of
offenses known as "maintenance," which generally prohibited helping
another person pursue a legal claim.44 Champerty involved an ar-
rangement by which an individual agreed to finance another person's
litigation in exchange for a portion of the ultimate proceeds. 45 Barra-
try, a related offense, was defined as "the offense of frequently excit-
ing and stirring up quarrels and suits between other individuals. 46
In their early common law forms, champerty and barratry were
aimed at deterring "speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous
lawsuits, [and] financial overreaching by a party of superior bargain-
ing position."47 By the nineteenth century, however, these objectives
were relaxed by a growing judicial acceptance of the legitimacy of as-
signing causes of action and third-party financing of litigation. 48 Ac-
41. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 71 A. 153, 167
(N.J. Ch. 1908) (declaring that NewJersey has "not adopted the English statutes of cham-
perty and maintenance").
42. Connecticut, for example, uses a public policy test to evaluate potentially champer-
tous arrangements. See Rice v. Farrell, 28 A.2d 7, 8 (Conn. 1942) (declaring that "the
common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance as applied to civil actions have
never been adopted in this state, and the only test is whether a particular transaction is
against public policy").
43. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 10-604 (prohibiting, inter alia, "solicit[ing]
another person to sue"); see also N.Y. JuD. LAw § 489 (McKinney 1983) (prohibiting the
solicitation or assignment of a "bond, promissory note .. .or any claim or demand, with
the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon").
44. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 422, 424 n.15 (1978).
45. Osprey, 532 S.E.2d at 273.
46. Id.
47. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997).
48. See Osprey, 532 S.E.2d at 275 n.3 (citing cases in which courts upheld agreements by
third parties to finance another's litigation); see also id at 277-78 (exalting the modern
doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and good faith as negating the need for continued
reliance on barratry and related doctrines to protect against contracts between parties with
unequal bargaining power).
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cordingly, courts began to take a more lenient view of contractual
arrangements formerly deemed barratrous or champertous. 49
2. Maryland Courts'Application of Barratry, Champerty, and Mainte-
nance. -The Court of Appeals of Maryland first narrowed the scope of
the doctrines of barratry, champerty, and maintenance in Schaferman
v. O'Brien,5  by upholding a contract for the assignment of a bank-
ruptcyjudgment.51 In so holding, the Schaferman court acknowledged
that historical notions of maintenance had become obsolete.52 The
definition of maintenance had been narrowed to mean cases "where a
man, improperly and for the purpose of stirring up litigation and
strife, encourages others, either to bring actions [or] to make
defences, which they have no right to make."5
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Wheeler v. Harrison & Byrd 4
upheld a contract in which a group of shareholders assigned their
rights to institute and defend suits to an attorney in exchange for a
contingent fee.55 The court rejected the contention that mainte-
nance required invalidating the contingent fee arrangement. 56 The
court declared that the arrangement fit neither the definition for
maintenance, which consisted of "the unlawful taking in hand or up-
holding of quarrels or sides to the disturbance or hindrance of com-
mon right," nor that of champerty, which occurred when a person
"upholds a controversy under a contract to have part of the property
or subject in dispute. 57
Maryland continued to modernize its contracts jurisprudence in
Schackow v. Medical-Legal Consulting Service, Inc.58 In Schackow, the
Court of Special Appeals considered whether a medical consulting
firm's recommendation that an injured party pursue a medical mal-
practice claim amounted to barratry, champerty, or maintenance.59
In rejecting the argument that the conduct at issue constituted barra-
try, the court emphasized that "solicitation" was an essential element
49. See id. at 276 (noting two cases in which courts rejected arguments of champerty in
light of the modern view of the assignability of rights).
50. 28 Md. 565 (1868).
51. Id. at 576-77.
52. Id. at 574.
53. Id. at 574 (quoting Findon v. Parker, 11 M. & W. 679, 682 (1843)).
54. 94 Md. 147, 50 A. 523 (1901).
55. Id. at 158-59, 50 A. at 526-27.
56. Id. at 158, 50 A. at 526.
57. Id. at 158-59, 50 A. at 526-27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. 46 Md. App. 179, 416 A.2d 1303 (1980).
59. Id. at 193-97, 416 A.2d at 1311-13.
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of Maryland's statutory prohibition against barratry.6 ° Accordingly,
because the consulting firm did not solicit the injured party to sue,
the court held that barratry had not occurred.6'
The Schackow court employed similar reasoning as the Wheeler
court, declaring that the medical consultant's contingent fee arrange-
ment was similar to that commonly used by lawyers, and therefore did
not constitute barratry.62 The court further articulated that, as in the
practice of law, the "realities of modern medical malpractice," includ-
ing the expenses associated with technical assistance to educate the
plaintiff's attorneys and the gathering of evidence and obtaining of
expert witnesses, may necessitate compensation of a medical consult-
ant on a contingent fee basis.63
Similarly, in Son v. Margolius,64 the Court of Appeals upheld an
agreement by which the plaintiff paid the defendant a fee for refer-
ring him to an attorney.6 5 The plaintiff in the case was of Korean
decent and had limited English skills.66 After being seriously injured
in a car accident, the plaintiff entered into a fee-based contract with a
consultant to the Korean community who agreed to find the plaintiff
a suitable attorney.67 The plaintiff then refused to pay the consult-
ant's fee.68 Relying on Schackow and Maryland's barratry statute,6 9 the
court upheld the contract, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove
that the consultant engaged in the solicitation or "meddling" neces-
sary to constitute statutory barratry.7 ° Specifically, the court stated
that because the plaintiff had already determined he needed a lawyer,
it could not be maintained that the consultant "solicited" the plaintiff
to file a lawsuit.71
3. Other Jurisdictions' Views Regarding Barratry, Champerty, and
Maintenance.-Echoing the Maryland approach, a number of otherju-
60. Id. at 193-94, 416 A.2d at 1312.
61. Id. at 194 n.5, 416 A.2d at 1312 n.5.
62. See id. at 195-96, 416 A.2d at 1313 (accepting the medical consulting firm presi-
dent's description of the work of his organization as "largely an extension of the attorney's
work product in the area of medicine" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Id. at 196, 416 A.2d at 1313. The court elaborated that "[c]lients who can afford
attorneys only on a contingent fee basis cannot be expected to compensate a service ... at
a flat rate." Id.
64. 349 Md. 441, 709 A.2d 112 (1998).
65. Id. at 445-47, 709 A.2d at 113-15.
66. Id. at 447, 709 A.2d at 115.
67. Id. at 447-48, 709 A.2d at 115.
68. Id. at 443, 790 A.2d at 113.
69. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-604(a) (2000).
70. Son, 349 Md. at 460-61, 709 A.2d at 121.
71. Id.
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risdictions have accepted certain contractual arrangements consid-
ered champertous or barratrous at common law. Beginning more
than a century ago, these jurisdictions have supported the right of
parties to divide the costs of litigation, assign causes of action, and
enter into contingent fee arrangements.
As early as 1889, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Gilman v.
Jones,72 relaxed its definition of barratry to accommodate modern bus-
iness practices.73 Specifically, the court stated that "an interference in
a lawsuit [is] excusable when it is by one who has, or honestly believes
he has, a valuable interest in its prosecution."74 Other states have
adopted a similar approach. Connecticut, for example, has softened
its view of litigation financing arrangements, 7 and North Carolina has
narrowed its application of champerty to only those cases where "the
interference is clearly officious and for the purpose of stirring up
strife and continuing litigation.
76
This trend persisted throughout the twentieth century, as courts
continued to tailor these doctrines to permit the assignment of causes
of action and arrangements for third parties to finance litigation. For
example, in Temeron, Inc. v. Ferraro Energy Corp.,7 7 the Court of Appeals
of Oklahoma upheld an auditor's contractual right to bring a suit on
behalf of its gas-supplier client.78 The auditor contracted with the gas
supplier to pursue litigation resulting from the discovery of custom-
ers' underpayments. 79 In upholding the arrangement, the Oklahoma
court reasoned that the auditor could bring the action on behalf of
the supplier because it was agreed to by contract and "[i] t is generally
accepted that a bona fide purchaser or assignee of a mere right of
action is not guilty of champerty . 80 Similarly, in Giambattista v.
72. 5 So. 785 (Ala. 1889).
73. Id. at 787.
74. Id. The court also excluded from champerty's scope the financing of lawsuits be-
tween relatives, including spouses, and likewise made exceptions for attorney-client ar-
rangements and the financing of litigation for the poor. Id.
75. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 23 A. 193, 196 (Conn. 1891) (allowing in certain
circumstances an impoverished person to assign his cause of action, thereby allowing "a
more fortunate friend [to] assist him, and wait for his compensation until the suit is deter-
mined"); see also Richardson v. Rowland, 40 Conn. 565, 573 (Conn. 1873) (rejecting a
champerty defense and permitting a plaintiff who helped the defendant resolve a mort-
gage dispute recover half of the settlement proceeds).
76. See Smith v. Hartsell, 63 S.E. 172, 174 (N.C. 1908) (upholding the assignment of a
cause of action because it did not violate the modem threshold for champerty) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
77. 861 P.2d 319 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
78. Id. at 326.
79. Id. at 321-22.
80. Id. at 326.
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National Bank of Commerce," the Court of Appeals of Washington up-
held an agreement in which a money broker agreed to finance litiga-
tion on behalf of investors.82 The court reasoned that the agreements
were not champertous because there was no evidence of intermed-
dling by the brokers or that the agreements were not negotiated at
arm's length.8 3
Several other recent decisions also indicate that assignments of
causes of action and agreements to share the proceeds of litigation do
not constitute champerty.8 4 For example, in In re Perrysburg Market-
place Co., 5 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio
held that champerty was inapplicable to a contract under which a
mortgagee purchased a debtor's loan from a trust company.8 6 Like-
wise, in Schwartz v. Eliades,87 the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld an
agreement between taxi drivers to share the expenses of litigation and
split litigation proceeds.88 The court reasoned that because the as-
signing cab company retained an "equitable interest" in the litigation
even after assignment, the arrangement did not constitute
champerty.8 9
Other jurisdictions, instead of reshaping or narrowly applying the
doctrines, have gone so far as to abrogate champerty, barratry, and
maintenance altogether. In Massachusetts, for example, in Saladini v.
Righellis,9° the Supreme Judicial Court evaluated whether champerty
should invalidate an agreement by which one party agreed to advance
funds to allow another party to pursue potential legal claims arising
out of his interest in real estate.91 After reviewing decisions from vari-
ous jurisdictions, the court abolished the doctrine altogether. 92 Spe-
81. 586 P.2d 1180 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
82. Id. at 1186.
83. Id.
84. See Berman v. Linnane, 679 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Mass. 1997) (removing from cham-
perty's scope agreements in which the financing party has an interest in the litigation prior
to entering into the purported champertous arrangement); Rienhardt v. Kelly, 917 P.2d
963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an agreement by a testator's son to finance a
beneficiary's litigation in exchange for twenty-five percent of the value of the proceeds was
not champertous); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a
sister's agreement to finance her brother's litigation in return for a share of the litigation
proceeds).
85. 208 B.R. 148 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997).
86. Id. at 161.
87. 939 P.2d 1034 (Nev. 1997).
88. Id. at 1037.
89. Id.
90. 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
91. Id. at 1224-25.
92. Id. at 1225-26.
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cifically, the court held that champerty was no longer needed "to
protect against the evils once feared [because of new] devices that
more effectively accomplish these ends."9 3 In addition, the court ar-
ticulated that the standard for evaluating future agreements to fi-
nance lawsuits should be based on balancing the equities of each
case.9 4 In conducting this balancing test, the court emphasized that it
would still closely scrutinize litigation financing agreements, but in
doing so, it would also consider "whether the fees charged [were] ex-
cessive or whether any recovery by a prevailing party is vitiated be-
cause of some impermissible overreaching by the financier."9 5
Furthermore, the court noted that its analysis would be guided "by a
rule of what is fair and reasonable," including consideration of the
circumstances under which the contract was made.9 6
The Supreme Court of South Carolina followed suit in Osprey, Inc.
v. Cabana Limited Partnership,97 upholding an arrangement in which
one party purchased an interest in another party's lawsuit.98 Using
reasoning similar to that of the Saladini court, the Osprey court abol-
ished champerty as a defense to contract enforcement in South Caro-
lina.9 9 Specifically, the court stated that modern legal principles were
better equipped to address the problems once analyzed under "dated
notions of champerty."' °
B. Determining the Validity of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maryland.
Maryland, like other states, has adopted section 187 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine the validity of contractual
choice-of-law provisions.1 0 1 In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas &
93. Id. at 1226-27. The evils originally feared at common law, according to the court,
were "speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or financial overreaching
by a party of superior bargaining position." Id. at 1226.
94. Id. at 1227.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 532 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 2000).
98. Id. at 271.
99. Id. at 277.
100. Id. (explaining that instead of barratry and related doctrines, "the doctrines of un-
conscionability, duress, and good faith establish standards of fair dealing between oppos-
ing parties").
101. SeeAm. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 572, 659 A.2d 1295,
1301 (1995) (noting Maryland courts' application of section 187 to choice-of-law provi-
sions). Section 187(2) of the Restatement states that:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied ...unless . . .application of the law of the chosen state
would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue
2003]
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Co.,' 0 2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland displaced the parties' choice
of Pennsylvania law on the ground that the indemnity clause con-
tained in the contract violated Maryland public policy.' 0 3 To support
its decision, the court cited a Maryland statute expressly declaring in-
demnity clauses to be contrary to public policy, and therefore void
and unenforceable. 10 4 The Bethlehem Steel court emphasized that a
mere discrepancy between another state's law and that of Maryland
would not render the other state's law unenforceable in Maryland
courts. 10 5 Furthermore, the court held that to displace the law chosen
by the contracting parties, there must be a strong public policy against
enforcing that law in Maryland. °6 For the Bethlehem Steel court, the
statutory prohibition against indemnity clauses was proof that Mary-
land's public policy against enforcing such clauses was "sufficiently
strong" to displace the parties' chosen law of Pennsylvania.10 7
In National Glass, Inc. v. J C. Penney Properties, Inc.,l0 s the Court of
Appeals again relied on statutory evidence to invalidate a choice-of-
law provision."0 9 In National Glass, a subcontractor and a property
owner included in their agreement a waiver of the subcontractor's
right to claim a mechanic's lien.110 Such a waiver was permissible
under Pennsylvania law, the law chosen by the parties."' A Maryland
statute, however, expressly declared that any such waiver was void.
112
By including in the statute an explicit declaration that such a contract
was "void as against the public policy of this State," the court deter-
mined that the Maryland General Assembly had unequivocally told
the Maryland judiciary that a contractual provision waiving the right
and which, under the rule of§ 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2)(b) (1971). Comment g to section
187 further specifies that it is for the forum to "apply its own legal principles in determin-
ing whether a given policy is a fundamental one." Id. § 187, cmt. g.
102. 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985).
103. Id. at 193, 498 A.2d at 610.
104. Id. at 187, 498 A.2d at 607; see, e.g., McCabe v. Medex, 141 Md. App. 558, 556, 786
A.2d 57, 62 (2001) (invalidating an employer's commission payment scheme because it
violated Maryland's Wage Payment Collection Law and therefore was unenforceable be-
cause "a contract conflicting with public policy set forth in a statute is invalid to the extent
of the conflict between the contract and that policy").
105. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 189, 498 A.2d at 608.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 336 Md. 606, 650 A.2d 246 (1994).
109. Id at 612-13, 650 A.2d at 249-50.
110. Id. at 609, 650 A.2d at 247.
111. Id., 650 A.2d at 248.
112. Id., 650 A.2d at 247-48.
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to claim a mechanic's lien was void as against public policy.' 13 The
court reasoned that the only way the Maryland law would not apply
was if Maryland did not have a materially greater interest in the deter-
mination of the issue than did Pennsylvania. 14 The party to be pro-
tected by the lien was a Maryland corporation that had furnished
services on Maryland property, while Pennsylvania's sole interest was a
non-party's incorporation in Pennsylvania. 115 The court, therefore,
held that Maryland had a materially greater interest in the issue, and
thus Maryland law displaced the parties' choice of Pennsylvania law.' 1 6
In Kronovet v. Lipchin, "7 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in
applying section 187, again relied upon statutory evidence to examine
the strength of a state's public policy." 8 The Kronovet court evaluated
whether the parties' choice of Maryland law should be displaced by
New York law as a result of the parties' high degree of contacts with
New York, giving it a "materially greater interest" in the determination
of the issue.119 In upholding the choice-of-law provision, the court
held that New York did not have a sufficiently strong fundamental
policy against the purported usurious contract at issue so as to require
the court to displace the choice-of-law provision.12 Specifically, the
court relied upon a New York statute that removed interest rate ceil-
ings from loans of $250,000 or more.12  In light of the statute, the
court reasoned, it could hardly be argued that the interest rate in Kro-
novet violated any New York public policy. 122 The court also noted
that it was "generally accepted that the parties to a contract may agree
as to the law which will govern their transaction, even as to issues go-
ing to the validity of the contract."' 123
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Accrued Financial Services, Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
113. Id. at 614, 650 A.2d at 250 (citing MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-113 (1996)). The
court cited with approval its reasoning in Bethlehem Steel, in which it struck down a choice-
of-law provision that similarly would have violated an express legislative mandate declaring
such a contract void and unenforceable. Id. at 615, 650 A.2d at 250.
114. Id. at 615, 650 A.2d at 250.
115. Id., 650 A.2d at 251.
116. Id. at 615-16, 650 A.2d at 250-51.
117. 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980).
118. Id. at 46-47, 415 A.2d at 1106.
119. Id. at 46, 415 A.2d at 1106.
120. Id. 46-47, 415 A.2d at 1106.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 47, 415 A.2d at 1106.
123. Id. at 43, 415 A.2d at 1104.
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court's judgment that the contractual arrangements between AFS and
its clients, tenants at various shopping mall outlets, were void as
against the public policy of Maryland.'1 4 Writing for the majority,
Judge Niemeyer began by declaring that an assignment of a cause of
action is permissible under many circumstances. 125  However, the
court clarified that such assignments are not enforceable if they con-
flict with public policy.126 The court, therefore, set out to determine
whether the assignments did indeed violate Maryland public policy.'
2 1
In conducting its inquiry, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the
purpose of the assignments in this case was not to satisfy a pre-existing
obligation, but instead to "further [AFS's] business of uncovering
claims and earning fees from collecting on them."' 2' The court noted
that when the assignments were entered into, the tenants had no
knowledge of whether any claims existed.' 29 Furthermore, if AFS dis-
covered a claim, the tenants would be essentially powerless to stop
AFS from pursuing the claim because they were required to pay AFS a
fee even if it did not pursue the litigation. 3 ' In the Fourth Circuit's
view, this arrangement left the tenants with the "Hobson's Choice" of
either allowing AFS to pursue the litigation or paying AFS a fee.3 1
Accordingly, the court concluded that by essentially wresting control
of the litigation from the tenants, AFS's purpose in suing was not to
protect its clients, but rather to promote litigation as a means of gen-
erating fees for itself.13 2 As such, the arrangements amounted to "in-
termeddl [ing] and stir [ring] up litigation for the purpose of making a
profit," thereby implicating Maryland's public policy against
barratry. 13
124. Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir. 2002).
125. Id. at 296-97. In making this assessment, the court declared that "[a] chose in ac-
tion in tort is generally assignable, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, if it is a right
which would survive the assignor and could be enforced by his personal representative."
Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 319 Md. 226, 234, 572 A.2d 144, 148
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Id. at 297 (quoting McCabe v. Medex, 141 Md. App. 558, 566, 786 A.2d 57, 62
(2001) (stating "a contract conflicting with public policy set forth in a statute is invalid to
the extent of the conflict between the contract and that policy")).
127. Id. The court noted that although the assignments contained a choice-of-law provi-
sion, which called for the application of California law, the provision was enforceable only
to the extent that it was consistent with the public policy of the forum state, Maryland. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 298.
130. Id. at 297-98.
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The Fourth Circuit then scrutinized the arrangements in light of
Maryland law regarding barratry, champerty, and maintenance. 3 4
Under Maryland's narrowing form of barratry, the court noted that
the state maintained a public policy against improperly encouraging
others to instigate litigation. 3 5 The court concluded that the modern
policy condemned "schemes to promote litigation for the benefit of
[the promoter] rather than for the benefit of the litigant or the pub-
lic." '3 6 The Fourth Circuit also pointed to the existence of a barratry
misdemeanor statute as further evidence of Maryland's public policy
against such activity.' 3 7 In light of this authority, the court held the
contracts in violation of Maryland's strong public policy because they
gave AFS the power to "mine lawsuits" and profit from them without
regard to the genuine interests of the tenants.' 3 s In addition, the
court concluded that the assignments violated Maryland's public pol-
icy against supplying expert testimony for a contingent fee. "1 3 9 Specifi-
cally, the court found objectionable the contractual provisions calling
for AFS's auditors to testify regarding an action in which AFS might
receive a contingent fee.' 4 °
In his dissent, Judge Michael cited two reasons for notjoining the
majority."' First, he explained that a proper conflict of laws analysis
required the court to honor the parties' choice-of-law provision,
thereby making California law applicable.14 2 Second, Judge Michael
reasoned that because AFS owned the claims it brought against Prime,
it was not supplying expert testimony for a contingent fee. 1 4 3 In sup-
port of his first argument, Judge Michael declared that the majority
misapplied the test for determining the validity of a choice-of-law pro-
vision.' 4 4 Specifically, Judge Michael explained that Restatement (Sec-
134. Id. at 298-300.
135. Id. at 299.
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OcC. & PROF. § 10-604 (2000), which prohibits a
person "without an existing relationship or interest in an issue" from "solicit[ing] another
person to sue").
138. Id. The court concluded its barratry analysis by noting that even though the assign-
ments were void as against public policy, the tenants could still file the claims uncovered by
AFS during its audit, adding that "[o]ur holding focuses only on the promotional efforts of




141. Id. at 300 (Michael, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 302. See supra note 101 (providing the relevant text of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws section 187(2) (b) (1971)).
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ond) of Conflict of Laws section 187 requires three conditions to be met
before Maryland law can displace California law on the ground that
Maryland public policy is implicated.' 45 After finding inconclusive evi-
dence under the first condition, regarding which state's law would ap-
ply in the absence of an effective choice-of-law provision, Judge
Michael argued that the second condition was not met because barra-
try, champerty, and maintenance were becoming obsolete in Mary-
land, and therefore could not constitute a strong public policy. 146
Judge Michael also noted that the barratry statute contained no ex-
press pronouncement regarding public policy, as required by Mary-
land case law.' 4 7 Finally, as to the third factor under the Restatement
test, Judge Michael argued that California, not Maryland, had a mate-
rially greater interest in the resolution of this case. 148 In sum, Judge
Michael declared that a full analysis under the Restatement required
the application of California law as selected by the parties.' 49 As a
result, the assignments were valid because California does not recog-
nize the doctrines of barratry, champerty, and maintenance. 151
Judge Michael also argued that AFS's conduct failed to meet the
legal standards for the current application of the doctrines of chain-
perty, maintenance, and barratry in Maryland.' 51 Specifically, Judge
Michael declared that AFS was not "soliciting litigation," the parties to
the agreement possessed equal bargaining power, and the doctrines
had narrowed to exclude AFS's conduct from their scope.152 Moreo-
ver, Judge Michael explained that the majority's holding ignored im-
portant benefits promoted by arrangements similar to those between
AFS and its clients. 15
3
145. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 302 (Michael, J., dissenting). California law should
be displaced, Judge Michael declared, only if the analysis shows that Maryland law must
apply in the absence of an effective choice-of-law provision, the California law is contrary to
a fundamental (or strong) public policy of Maryland, and Maryland has a materially
greater interest in the outcome of the issue than California. Id.
146. Id. at 303. Judge Michael added that, "as far as I can tell, Maryland has not used
these common law doctrines to invalidate any contract in the last one hundred years." Id.
147. Id. at 304 (citing Nat'l Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Props., Inc., 650 Md. 606, 612-15,
650 A.2d 246, 249-50 (1994)).
148. Id. at 305. Judge Michael applied the "contacts" test from section 188(2) of the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws to arrive at the conclusion that "California has signifi-
candy more contacts with the matter than Maryland." Id. at 304.
149. Id. at 300.
150. Id. at 302 (citing Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124, 142 n.26 (Cal.
1987)).
151. Id. at 305.
152. Id. at 305-06. Judge Michael also noted that the common law rationale for the
doctrines, including protection against unequal bargaining power and financial overreach-
ing, was not present in this case. Id. at 306.
153. See id. at 306-07. Judge Michael noted that:
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Finally, Judge Michael acknowledged the prohibition of paying
contingent fees to expert witnesses, but explained that AFS's auditors
would not be giving expert testimony.' 54 To the contrary, he argued
that because the assignments made AFS the real party in interest, AFS
was entitled to offer the testimony of its employees in support of its
case. 155 Consequently, Judge Michael concluded that such arrange-
ments did not violate any public policy.1 56
IV. ANALYSIS
In Accrued Financial Services, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit inappropriately resurrected the doctrines of
barratry, champerty, and maintenance to invalidate agreements be-
tween AFS and its clients.157 In so holding, the court mistakenly inter-
preted Maryland case law and statutory authority as requiring the
agreements to be invalidated as void against public policy. The court
did so even though the barratry statute at issue did not expressly de-
clare that such agreements violate public policy, as required by the
Maryland Court of Appeals's decisions in Bethlehem Steel and National
Glass. 58 By betraying Maryland case law in this manner, the Fourth
Circuit complicated the legal landscape for Maryland corporations
and individuals exercising their freedom of contract.' 59
Furthermore, in rejecting AFS's choice-of-law provision, the
Fourth Circuit demonstrated an inadvisable paternalism over the par-
ties' efforts to contract freely. This paternalism ignores the jurispru-
dential trend of upholding formerly champertous contracts when the
contracting parties are sophisticated individuals or entities with equal
bargaining power. 6 ' In addition, by rigidly applying Maryland's infre-
[Tihe majority's argument that the assignments serve AFS's interests more than
its clients'... interests is without any foundation. Although it is true the tenants
could have retained their claims and sued in their own names, history has proven
that option to be uneconomical in most instances .... The majority's decision
thus hurts the tenants, not just AFS. The decision benefits the mall owners and
managers, who could be getting away with overcharging and fraud.
Id.
154. Id. at 307.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 300.
158. Id. at 297-300; see supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text (discussing the hold-
ings in Bethlehem Steel and National Glass stating that strong public policy is required to
warrant the invalidation of a choice-of-law clause).
159. See Accrued Fin. Serus., 298 F.2d at 297-300 (interpreting the agreements between
AFS and its tenant clients as void as against Maryland public policy).
160. See Temeron, Inc. v. Ferraro Energy Corp., 861 P.2d 319, 326 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993)
(affirming the accepted notion that "a bona fide purchaser or assignee of a mere right of
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quently cited barratry statute, the court failed to consider the equities
of the case. Specifically, the court ignored the benefits that the con-
tracts accorded to AFS's clients-namely, protection against their
landlord's fraudulent billing practices.1 61 Thus, the court betrayed a
long-held jurisprudential acceptance of granting exceptions to barra-
try, champerty, and maintenance when justice so requires. 162
Instead of invalidating the agreements through an outmoded
misdemeanor provision, the court should have upheld the contracts,
thereby adhering to the mandate of Bethlehem Steel and National Glass,
while simultaneously acknowledging the utility of modern contractual
arrangements once deemed unenforceable under barratry, chain-
perty, and maintenance. Furthermore, the court should have fol-
lowed the lead of other jurisdictions, and held that barratry,
champerty, and maintenance are inapplicable to modern contracts
negotiated by sophisticated parties with equal bargaining power.1 63 In
place of these obsolescing doctrines, the court should have adopted a
balancing-of-the-equities standard for evaluating the type of arrange-
ments considered champertous at common law.' 64 Adopting this
standard would respect the freedom of contract of sophisticated par-
ties, while preserving the court's power to strike down such contracts
should the equities of the case demand it.'65
action is not guilty of champerty"); see also Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 586
P.2d 1180, 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a money broker's agreement to fi-
nance another party's litigation was not champertous because the money broker had a
legitimate interest in the dispute).
161. See Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 307 (Michael, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
court's decision deprived the tenants of their right to protect themselves against the fraud-
ulent billing practices of their landlords by the cost-effective means of entering into assign-
ment contracts).
162. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 23 A. 193, 196 (1891) (carving out an exception to
champerty when an impoverished person called upon "a more fortunate friend [to] assist
him" with litigation expenses); see also Schackow v. Medical-Legal Cons. Serv., Inc., 46 Md.
App. 179, 197, 416 A.2d 1303, 1313 (1980) (upholding a contingency fee agreement as a
legitimate arrangement and not a champertous practice).
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing cases in which courts have
upheld assignments of causes of action and agreements to finance litigation).
164. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997). Although not explic-
itly labeled as such, the test articulated by the Saladini court involves balancing the equities
involved in agreements to finance litigation. Id. Specifically, the court declared that its
champerty-free analysis of such arrangements would be guided "by a rule of what is fair
and reasonable, looking to all the circumstances at the time the arrangement is made to
determine whether the agreement should be set aside or modified." Id. These circum-
stances include: the "respective bargaining position of the parties at the time the agree-
ment was made, whether both parties were aware of the terms and consequences of the
agreement, whether [a party] . . . [is] able to pursue the lawsuit at all without [another
party's] funds," and whether the fee charged by the financing party is unreasonable. Id.
165. Id.
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A. The Court's Manufactured Public Policy Diverges from Prior Statutory
Authority and Case Law
In rejecting the contractual arrangements between AFS and its
clients, the court in Accrued Financial Services manufactured a public
policy against these contracts that is unsupported by Maryland prece-
dent. 66 Specifically, the court's reliance on Maryland's misdemeanor
barratry statutory provision infers a public policy that is not evident on
the statute's face. 6 7 Reading the statute in this way contradicts the
Maryland Court of Appeals' decisions in Bethlehem Steel and National
Glass, which require the presence of an explicit statutory declaration
of public policy to override the law chosen by the contracting par-
ties.' 68 Maryland's barratry statute contains no such pronouncement,
but is merely, as Judge Michael aptly noted in his dissent, a "run-of-
the-mill misdemeanor provision."16 9 Thus, while criminalizing the ac-
tivity certainly indicates Maryland's disfavor of champertous conduct,
the statute still fails to establish any strong public policy mandate, as
required by Bethlehem Steel.' 7 ° As such, Maryland's misdemeanor bar-
ratry statute fails to "unequivocally" tell Maryland courts that arrange-
ments such as those in Accrued Financial Services are void as against
Maryland public policy.17 '
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's divergence from Bethlehem Steel
and National Glass creates vexing questions for future courts attempt-
ing to assess the validity of contractual arrangements that appear to
conflict with Maryland statutes. The bright-line rule of Bethlehem Steel
and National Glass requires Maryland courts to invalidate contracts
only upon an express statutory declaration that agreements embody-
ing such conduct are void and unenforceable.' 72 This rule provides a
workable standard by which the judiciary and the legislature together
can communicate to arrive at a unified pronouncement of Maryland
166. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 303 n.2 (Michael, J., dissenting) (explaining that
"[t]he majority does not cite a single case in which a contract was found to violate any
Maryland common law against maintenance, champerty, or barratry").
167. Id. at 304 (Michael,J., dissenting) (noting that Maryland's barratry statute does not
contain an express statement of strong public policy).
168. Nat'l Glass, Inc. v.J.C. Penney Props., Inc. 336 Md. 606, 613-14, 650 A.2d 246, 249-
50 (1994) (declaring that a contract was void because a Maryland statute expressly stated
that such contracts were "void as against the public policy of this state"); see also Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 187, 498 A.2d 605, 607 (1985) (invalidating
a contract because of a Maryland statute that expressly declared indemnity clauses to be
contrary to public policy).
169. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 304 (Michael, J., dissenting).
170. Bethlehem Stee4 304 Md. at 189, 498 A.2d at 608 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608.
172. Id.; Nat'l Glass, 336 Md. at 612-13, 650 A.2d at 249.
20031
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
public policy. The rule also promotes judicial consistency, and by re-
questing the legislature to manifestly inform the Maryland judiciary
that particular agreements are void, shows appropriate deference to
the lawmaking body.'73
In contrast, the court's decision in Accrued Financial Services mud-
dies the waters of future public policy determinations by invalidating a
contract without a clear legislative mandate. As a result, future courts
will be left to speculate as to whether any misdemeanor statute is suffi-
cient evidence of a strong public policy, or whether Bethlehem Steel and
National Glass are still good law.174 This ambiguity raises the possibil-
ity that future courts will be forced to invalidate a properly negotiated
choice-of-law provision for the sole reason that the activity involved is
prohibited by an archaic and seldom recognized misdemeanor
statute.
In Accrued Financial Services, the court relied on Maryland's barra-
try statute, which was enacted in 1908,' and has been largely unrec-
ognized by the courts.'7 6 This judicial apathy toward the statute is
evident in the court's opinion, which fails to cite a single case in which
a Maryland court applied the statute to invalidate a contract.177 Fur-
thermore, in Son v. Margolius, although the Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the statute, it failed to indicate that the statutory prohibitions
implicated a strong public policy of Maryland.17 In addition, as the
statute slipped into obsolescence in Maryland, other jurisdictions ex-
pressed a growing acceptance of contracts once deemed barratrous. 179
In light of this case law, the Accrued Financial Services court's invalida-
tion of the parties' contracts was a misapplication of Maryland prece-
dent and contrary to the modernized contracts jurisprudence of other
173. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608.
174. See Accrued Fin. Seros., 298 F.3d at 303 (Michael, J., dissenting) (noting that "the
only time Maryland courts have found a contractually chosen law to violate strong Mary-
land public policy is when the foreign law conflicts with a Maryland statute that contains a
clear statement of policy").
175. Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 349 Md. 441, 459, 709 A.2d 112,
120 (1998).
176. Only a handful of Maryland decisions mention the statute. See id. (citing only one
other case, Schackow, as relevant to its barratry discussion). Id. (citing Schackow v. Medical-
Legal Consulting Serv., Inc., 46 Md. App. 179, 416 A.2d 1303 (1980)).
177. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 297-300. The majority cites no other cases that have
utilized Maryland's barratry statute to invalidate a contract. Id.
178. Son, 349 Md. at 459, 709 A.2d at 121. The Son court concluded that solicitation was
an essential element of barratry, and because no solicitation was evident, the defendant
had not committed barratry. Id. The decision, however, stopped short of declaring that
barratrous conduct violates a strong public policy in Maryland. Id.
179. See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 275 n.3 (S.C. 2000) (citing a
number of cases acknowledging the legitimacy of assigning causes of action).
[VOL. 62:361
ACCRUED FINANCIAL SERVICES V. PRIME RETAIL
jurisdictions. Thus, the decision sets a perplexing standard for future
courts attempting to modernize contracts jurisprudence while adher-
ing to Fourth Circuit authority.
B. The Court's Inadvisable Paternalism Denies the Parties' Freedom of
Contract and Ignores the Benefits of Contracts Previously
Deemed Champertous
The court in Accrued Financial Services relied upon its determina-
tion that the agreements between AFS and its clients were void as
against public policy to invalidate the parties' selection of California
law to govern the contract."'8 In so doing, the court exhibited an in-
advisable paternalism over the parties' freedom to enter a type of con-
tract that has been viewed favorably by numerous other
jurisdictions.181 In addition, the court's paternalism contradicts the
spirit of numerous other decisions by ignoring the benefits the con-
tract provided to AFS's clients.18 2
The Fourth Circuit failed to appreciate that the common law ra-
tionale for barratry is ill-suited to evaluating modem arrangements
between sophisticated parties contracting with equal bargaining
power.' 8 3 Far from being designed to evaluate business contracts, the
historical justification of barratry was the desire to protect disadvan-
taged parties against "financial overreaching by a party of superior
bargaining power. '  Therefore, in order to apply the doctrine to
contracts like those at issue in Accrued Financial Services, courts must
"mold an ancient doctrine to modern circumstances."'" 5 Contorting
the doctrine in this way ignores the reality of contracts between so-
phisticated parties-that the parties do not need the court's protec-
tion against the financial overreaching practices that occurred in the
past.186 In Accrued Financial Services, for example, AFS's clients in-
cluded such nationwide retailers as Anne Klein, Corning Revere, Pub-
180. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 297-300.
181. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have
upheld agreements to finance litigation).
182. See, e.g., Schackow v. Medical-Legal Cons. Serv., Inc., 46 Md. App. 179, 197, 416
A.2d 1303, 1313 (1980) (upholding a contingent fee arrangement between a client and
his medical consultant because the client could not afford to pay the consultant a flat rate).
183. See Osprey, 532 S.E.2d at 277 (declaring that instead of "the dated notions of cham-
perty," modern contractual arrangements are better evaluated using the doctrines of un-
conscionability, duress, and good faith).
184. Saladini v. Righellis, 68 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997).
185. Id. at 1227.
186. See HaroldJ. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea or Placebo?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
415, 425 (1995) (citing a proposal that "would allow the market to sort out appropriate
financing arrangements at the expense of vestigial champerty restrictions").
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lishers' Warehouse, and Lechter's.'8 7 Therefore, as Judge Michael
noted in his dissent, it would be reasonable to believe that the clients
bargained with AFS on equal footing. 88 Accordingly, because the
original justification underlying barratry was absent and the parties
were in fact sophisticated entities with equal bargaining power, the
Fourth Circuit should have adhered to the position of other jurisdic-
tions and upheld the contracts.'1 9
In addition to ignoring the parties' sophistication, the Accrued Fi-
nancial Services court's paternalistic approach rejected the long-held
practice of granting an exception to champerty, barratry, and mainte-
nance when required by the equities of a particular case.' 9 ' For exam-
ple, as early as 1891, courts have cited equitable concerns in deeming
as nonchampertous, agreements that allowed third parties to assist an
impoverished person with the costs of litigation.19 ' In Maryland, the
Court of Appeals articulated this idea in Schackow, upholding a contin-
gent fee agreement on the ground that a client who could afford an
attorney only on a contingent fee basis could not be expected to com-
pensate a medical consultant on a flat rate.1
9 2
Although AFS's clients certainly were not impoverished, their
case did present equitable concerns.1 9 3 Specifically, by assigning their
causes of action to AFS, the tenants obtained an economically effi-
cient method of protecting themselves from overbilling and fraud;' 9 4
and by virtue of these assignments, AFS discovered a potential claim
of gross overbilling by the landlord.' 95 By resorting to a doctrine de-
signed to prevent "financial overreaching," the court's decision ex-
posed the tenants to overreaching on the part of the landlord. In this
187. Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 306 (4th Cir. 2002)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. See Temeron, Inc. v. Ferraro Energy Corp., 861 P.2d 319, 326 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding an auditor's right to bring a lawsuit on behalf of its gas-supplier client); see also
Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 586 P.2d 1180, 1188 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (up-
holding a money broker's agreement to finance litigation on behalf of investors).
190. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts upheld
agreements to finance litigation).
191. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 23 A. 193, 196 (Conn. 1891).
192. Schackow v. Medical-Legal Cons. Serv., Inc., 46 Md. App. 179, 196, 416 A.2d 1303,
1313 (1980).
193. See Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 307 (Michael, J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority decision would disadvantage the tenant, as well as AFS).
194. Id. at 301. Indeed, the arrangements made access to auditing services realistic for
smaller tenants, who otherwise may not have been able to afford such services. Id.
195. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 295 (noting AFS's contention that Prime's "improper
charges and reserve assessments" were "systematic and pervasive" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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way, the court's decision harmed the tenants, not only AFS.196 As a
result, the shopping center tenants are left with a different "Hobson's
Choice" than that initially feared by the majority.197 Left without the
ability to assign their causes of action, individual tenants must decide
whether to undertake the time and expense of litigating for a small
potential recovery or submit to continued fraud on the part of their
landlord.'98 This outcome contradicts the reasoning of earlier deci-
sions by failing to consider the inequity that will result from invalidat-
ing an agreement that accords important benefits to the contracting
parties.1 99
C. The Court Should Have Adopted a Balancing-of-the-Equities Test to
Evaluate Formerly Champertous Agreements
Instead of relying on Maryland's seldom used barratry statute to
find evidence of a strong public policy against the arrangements be-
tween AFS and its clients, the Fourth Circuit should have followed the
lead of other jurisdictions and held champerty, barratry, and mainte-
nance to be inapplicable to this kind of modern contract. 200 In addi-
tion, when the Fourth Circuit evaluates future choice-of-law provisions
that implicate Maryland public policy, it should adhere to the com-
mands of Bethlehem Steel and National Glass by invalidating such provi-
sions only upon the presence of an express legislative mandate. 20 1
Moreover, in the absence of an express statutory pronouncement, the
court should not resort to outdated common law doctrines, but in-
stead should apply a balancing-of-the-equities test as first articulated
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Saladini.20 2
The Saladini court, after abrogating champerty, barratry, and
maintenance, stated that it would still closely scrutinize agreements to
196. Id at 307 (Michael, J., dissenting).
197. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 298 (discussing the "Hobson's Choice" faced by the
tenants of either allowing AFS to pursue litigation on their behalf or paying AFS a fee).
198. See id. at 307 (Michael, J., dissenting).
199. See, e.g., Schackow v. Medical-Legal Cons. Serv., Inc., 46 Md. App. 179, 196, 416
A.2d 1303, 1313 (1980) (upholding a contingent fee arrangement because without such an
agreement, "the realities of modem medical malpractice" would lead to the inequitable
result of only wealthier individuals being able to pursue malpractice claims).
200. See, e.g., Berman v. Linnane, 679 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Mass. 1997) (holding that a third
party may finance litigation under an agreement to receive a portion of the ultimate pro-
ceeds as long as the party has an interest or the "possibility of an interest" in the subject
litigated).
201. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985);
see also Nat'l Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Props., Inc., 336 Md. 606, 650 A.2d 246 (1994).
202. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997).
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finance litigation by examining all relevant circumstances to the
agreement. 20 3 Specifically, the court elaborated:
[I]f an agreement to finance a lawsuit is challenged, we will
consider whether the fees charged are excessive or whether
any recovery by a prevailing party is vitiated because of some
impermissible overreaching by the financier.... We shall be
guided in our analysis by a rule of what is fair and reasona-
ble, looking to all of the circumstances at the time the ar-
rangement is made to determine whether the agreement
should be set aside or modified.2" 4
This balancing-of-the-equities test allows individualized determi-
nation of the fairness of a particular arrangement. Thus, by adopting
this test future courts would be free to uphold formerly champertous
contracts as legitimate arrangements under modern jurisprudence.
At the same time, courts would be free to reject agreements that
demonstrate the type of financial overreaching the doctrines of barra-
try, champerty, and maintenance seek to protect against. 20 5 Applying
this test to Accrued Financial Services would have required the court to
weigh the respective bargaining power of AFS and the tenants. The
court also would have examined whether the tenants understood the
consequences of the agreements and whether they were able to fund
the lawsuits without AFS's help. The court also would have acknowl-
edged that the tenants included a number of nationwide retailers.20 6
Had the Fourth Circuit applied this test, it likely would have con-
cluded that the contracts were negotiated on equal footing.207 Like-
wise, because of the tenants' sophistication, it is fair to assume the
tenants understood that they were surrendering their power to con-
trol potential litigation in exchange for a valuable service. 2 8 Finally,
although the individual tenants may have been able to finance the
203. Id.
204. Id. (footnote omitted).
205. In addition to the balancing-of-the-equities test, other remedies such as unconscio-
nability, duress, and good faith are available to protect against exploitive contracts. Os-
prey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277-78 (S.C. 2000).
206. Judge Michael also pointed out in his dissent that the tenants were "substantial
companies," while AFS was comprised of less than six employees. Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 306 (4th Cir. 2002) (Michael, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 306.
208. Id. (expressing as a fair conclusion that the tenants would not have entered into
the agreements with AFS if the agreements were not advantageous).
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litigation on their own, it was undeniably more cost-effective to allow
AFS to handle the litigation.20
9
In sum, the balancing-of-the-equities approach to contracts for-
merly considered champertous is advantageous because it avoids un-
necessary paternalism and strengthens parties' freedom of contract.
In addition, the test preserves the court's ability to strike down exploi-
tive contracts when necessary.210 As a final advantage, the test is con-
sistent with the analysis articulated in Bethlehem Steel and National Glass,
allowing courts to invalidate choice-of-law provisions only if the law of
the chosen state conflicts with an explicit statutory declaration render-
ing the contract at issue void and unenforceable as against public
policy.211
V. CONCLUSION
In Accrued Financial Services, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit resuscitated the dormant doctrines of barratry,
champerty, and maintenance to declare that litigation financing con-
tracts and related assignments between AFS and its tenants were void
as against public policy.212 The court's declaration was inconsistent
with Maryland case law, which requires an express statutory pro-
nouncement before a court may declare a contract void as against Ma-
ryland's public policy. 213 The decision also reflects a paternalistic
approach in that the court used an antiquated doctrine to nullify a
modern contract between parties of equal bargaining power.21 4 The
court should have followed the lead of other jurisdictions in rejecting
the doctrines of barratry, champerty, and maintenance as ill-suited for
analyzing modem contractual arrangements. 215 Furthermore, the
court should have applied a balancing-of-the equities test to uphold
209. See id. at 301 (noting that tenants' claims in most audit periods amounted to a
relatively small dollar amount, and that therefore most tenants do not find it financially
worthwhile to conduct their own audits).
210. See Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1227 (describing the factors to be analyzed in evaluating
litigation financing agreements).
211. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605; Nat'l
Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Props., Inc., 336 Md. 606, 650 A.2d 246 (1994).
212. Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 298-300.
213. See Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605; see also Nat'l Glass, 336 Md. 606, 650
A.2d 246.
214. See supra notes 190-199 and accompanying text (arguing that the court's paternal-
ism is unsupported by precedent and deprives the tenants of an economically advanta-
geous arrangement).
215. See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277-78 (S.C. 2000) (holding
that the problems once addressed by barratry and related doctrines are now more appro-
priately remedied through the modern doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and good
faith).
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the agreements between AFS and its clients. In doing so, the court
would have protected the parties' freedom of contract, while simulta-
neously preserving the court's power to invalidate unfair and over-
reaching agreements designed simply to promote litigation.
Ross Q. PANKO
